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The reversed baseball cap 
One of the roving reporters of the German TY channel, ARD, went to 
Siberia for an exploration of uncharted tenitories and noncommodified 
folk. First he flew with Aeroflot from Moscow to Siberia, then he trav-
eled by boat to the end of the Siberian river system. There he took a bus 
inland to the end of that line, and finally he set off for the final leg of the 
trip in a Lada jeep. After days of travel, demonstrating in passing that the 
etymology of travel derives from travail, his team arri ved at a settlement 
close to the Arctic Sea, home to a tribe of circumpolar Tungusians known 
to ethnologists for their bearskin rituals. How do these indigenous people 
manage to cope in the post-Soviet era? He wanted to find out for the 
benefi t of the TV audiences back home. When he opened the door of the 
community store the camera man caught a primordial scene: a grand-
father with his grandchild on his knee. The grandfather was dressed in 
Tungusian garments, the grandchild had on its head - a reversed baseball 
cap.1 
I. John David Smith suggests that the juvenile habit or reversing the baseball cap may be linked to the cat-
cher's role in American baseball. Baseball never was a popular sport in Europe or Siberia, yet the reversed 
baseball cap is everywhere. fl is more like ly that ii emerged from inner city black culture. According to 
Forr1111e Magazine a New York adverlizing agency videotaped bedrooms or teenagers in 25 countries: ii was 
hard to tel l whether the rooms were in America, Europe or Asia (Tully). 
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Why is American vernacular culture so popular? Why are American 
goods so attractive, why are New World protagonists so mythogenic, 
why are its icons and genres so adaptive, why are its rhetorics and ver-
naculars so catching and why are its ritual transgressions so captivating 
for audiences all over the world? And what would explain lhat cultural 
Americanophilia may well coexi st with political Americanophobia 
(Watson)? Can the successful tease of American commodities be blamed 
on manipulation and post-Cold-War hegemony alone? Hardly. Their 
seductive quality was felt long before the American century was in 
place.2 But why have previous critics of commodification all but disap-
peared at the postmodern and postfordi st moment when the new and 
improved cargo of goods represents our only choice in the g lo bal depart-
ment store? Clearly, we should not ignore the global reach of American 
dollar diplomacy and of Yankee marketing skills. Their global impact 
and long-range effects are clearly visible today when American-style late 
capitalism is the "only game in town"(Gray). And yet, Jacque Lang's 
soundbyte "cultural imperialism" would not do. It is ruled out as too self-
serving and condescending by the many discriminating users of Amer-
ican culture among whom we count ourselves.3 Even Lang closed that 
chapter when he pinned a medal on Sylvester Stallone's breast. 
The following answer is grounded in a European perspective. Indeed it 
s imulates a "studied" E uropean gaze upon America in the tradition of de 
Tocqueville, Bryce and Myrdal that would identify what is different, if not 
exceptional about it.4 My initial thesis is simple: the ideological construc-
tions and hi storical experiences that have inspired an American exception-
2. I owe the title of my paper to To<l<l Git lin whose lecture at the Amerika lnstitut in the summer of 1995 
prompted me to develop a set of European answers to the 4uestion. Manuela Thurner, Martin Christac.l lcr, Jo hn 
David Smith, Maren Stange and Ulla Hasclstei n offered helpful critic ism. Such sterling ac.lvice has not elimi-
nated imperfections. 
3. Each age coho rt in post-war Germany was convinced that, while their members use American commo-
dities with discrimination and taste, the younger generations are caving in to Americanization. 
4. Inevitably these ruminations arc also part of a bicultu ral arg ument which has been running in my head 
since as a young exchange student I stepped off the Zephyr in East-Dubuque fo rty-two years ago - an internal 
d ialogue about lran,,..tlantic similarities and differe nces, exceptio nal isms and Sonden rege, but also about respe-
ctive blind spots, cognitive traps an<l comfortable stereotypes. On thisfo/ie a deux: B. Ostendorf . "Some Contra-
dictio ns in the Americanization-of-Germany Debate," in Ell iott Shore and Prank Trommler, c<l. /Jeing Present in 
the Orher Culture. New York: Bcrghahn Books 2000. T he b ibl iography lists an inordinate number of my own 
publicatio ns which signals a lack of humility. 1 quote the m as an extensio n of the arguments of this paper. 
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alism also propel its popular and commercial culture (Appleby). Before 
we begin speculating on the invisible hands that reversed the Tungusian 
baseball cap, it may therefore be helpful to delineate the encompassing 
design of American popular culture production and understand its success 
at home in order to better comprehend the workings of its representational 
and conunodified tease abroad. 
I. An American Popular Culture 
The terms "popular" and "culture" of the title require a transatlantic dif-
ferentiation. Quite early a cognitive difference emerged between the 
political rhetoric of the young republic and the King's English with far-
reaching consequences for the development of both high and popular cul-
tures on either side of the Atlantic.5 The difference had to do with a revo-
lutionary semantic change. The new American political and economic 
order was based on a popular mandate, not on a feudal order or on reli-
gious estates. Although the exercize of political power remained for a 
good while in the hands of gentlemen of property and standing, a class to 
which the Founding Fathers belonged, popular cul ture rode to its victory 
on the coattail s of republican self government and popular sovereignty.6 
This difference revolutionized not only the political, but al so the cultural 
order and redirected, in the long run, the semantic undertow of important 
key words, among them "popul ar" and "culture."7 
In his dictionary of 1755 the English lexicographer Dr. Johnson bad 
5. It is not the oirn or this pnper to define the generic boundaries of high, populnr nnd moss culture, nor to 
di fferentiate or historicize its subsectors such as subculture, counterculture, youth culture nor lo comme nt on 
the disappearance of normative markers between high, popular or mass cul ture in postmodernism. Instead I 
will focus on the enabling parameteri; that have made various sectors of American culture so popular. Cf. 
Jameson and Kuper for a d iscussion of the political contrad ictions in the uses of "cullure." 
6. Dictmar Herz comments on the elective affinity hclwccn American popular and political cultures in Die 
Woh/erwge11e Republik. Das ku11stit11tio11e/le De11ken des po/itisc:h-phi/usup/1isc:he11 Liberalis11111s. Paderborn: 
Schoeningh Verlag 1999, 335. 
7. European observers gave the young American Republic a fe w years before it would go belly up. But the 
American system has shown a rcmarkahle resiliency, longevity and adaplahility. Michael Kammcn's image of 
a machine that would go of itself is fitting. but the metaphor essentializes qualities that should be unraveled 
historically. 
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likened popularity to the mob to prostitution and contagious diseases, and 
he quotes Dryden to the effect that "a popular man is in truth no better 
than a prostitute to common fame and to the people." With the American 
revolution a radical semantic reversal with far reaching political conse-
quences was ushered in. For in the young republic the word "popular" 
had a post-revolutionary and American legitimacy. In short, the notion of 
the popular became the cornerstone of a New World political indigeniza-
tion. This fact was duly recorded in the first dictionary that recorded the 
new differences between American and English. In the 1828 edition of 
his American Dictionary of the English Language Noah Webster makes a 
telling use of Johnson's entry which involves a self-conscious act of dis-
tancing from Old World meanings. Webster does not question Johnson's 
authority as a lexicographer. Therefore he quotes his sample sentences 
verbatim, but then he begs to differ: "Not in the US"! In the U.S., he 
avers, the term "popular" celebrates the achievements of popular 
sovereignty and hence refers to the will and wisdom of the common man. 
And the latter, he adds with a nod to the doctor, includes a large portion 
of the educated elite. Webster's politicalJy motivated, inclusive under- J 1 
standing of the concept of the popular helps to explain why class divi-
sion, though it clearly existed as a social fact, never got off to a good 
start in the heads of common Americans. It simply lacked a figurable 
semantic space. To be sure there were rich and poor citizens in the young 
republic, but no divisive social boundaries would henceforth be attached 
to the notion of the popular.8 The fact that Americans continue to be hazy 
about matters of class may well have to do with the early indigenization 
of the popular as a basis of a social egalitarianism which would in due 
time also affect the notion of culture. 
The key term "culture" settled into an American semantic context later 
in the century. Ralph Waldo Emerson in The American Scholar had 
already hoped for "the gradual domestication of the idea of culture." 
(Kammen, xi). In marked contrast to Europe a decidedly egalitarian 
sense, made popular first by anthropologists such as Franz Boas, was 
spread out in Kroeber and Kluckhohn's notorious compendium. Culture, 
defined within the semantic space of a populist and progressive political 
8. When the wine waiter at Stratford St. Mary recommended a bottle to Randolph Churchill on the g rounds 
of its popularity the latter bellowed: "Whal makes you th ink I want to drink anything popular." 
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culture, constituted a "pragmatic charter of behavior." The popular front 
of the Thirties chimed in and claimed that culture was "ordinary" and that 
it expressed "a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period or a 
group." Progressivism and Marxism gave it a grand narrative embrace 
and defined it as economic and political praxis tout court (Bauman). 
Over time this progressive and marxisante, antlu·opological under-
standing of culture found a ready home in America since it implied a de-
hierarchization of European concepts of the political orders and their cul-
ture-based legitimation. America was not a "Kulturnation" as was Ger-
many, a self-identification that gave rise to the typical German put-down 
of Ameri ca as "kulturlos." The French seconded with numerous books on 
New World "decline" from Cornelius DePauw to Jean Baudrillard. 
According to the New World political undertow all citizens are 
embedded in a pragmatic charter of behavior and everyone is therefore 
involved in cultural praxis. Of course this egalitarian sweep excluded 
those who were not voting citizens; for, typically, inequality hinged on 
access to citizenship, not on access to culture. Hence the deepest 
cleavage in American culture remained, as W.E.B. DuBois had it, the 
exclusionary color line. Since the early logic of state was political, the 
young republic in marked contrast to E uropean nations did not have to 
formulate a "cultural policy" for the purpose of defining the union.9 
Where then rested cultural authority? With those who had political 
authority - not the privileged few, but "we the people," those who had the 
vote. This non-national grounding of culture allowed its egalitarian citi-
zens to 'cultivate' the plural differences in li festyles between a variety of 
peoples and to make these "figurable." Under these more or less egali-
tarian circumstances cultural difference was in fact culture-producing. 
For, one side-effect of practical pluralism enhanced by the free exercise 
and anti-establishment clauses of the First Amendment was that the prag-
matic need for tolerance toward otherness and the lack of a national cul-
tural agenda would in the long run atrophy the normative or doctrinal 
nature of all difference whether religious or cultural. Disestablishment 
and tolerance of free exercize converged to disarm the political clout of 
what in Europe Freud had deplored as the narcissism of minor differ-
9. Instead it invested civic culture with a religious purpose and created an American "Civil Religion." 
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ences. In Europe small cultural difference could be politically deadly. In 
America the right to be different was a leveler, it amounted over time to 
an Aujhebung of cultural difference. The disestablishment of cultural 
normativity had an important consequence: the emerging nineteenth-cen-
tury enterprise of popular culture had, relatively speaking, a free and 
level playing field - no "normative traditions" as in Europe, no estab-
lished cultural custodians and no powerful state could impede its growth . 
With these semantic provisos in mind an archeological dig into the his-
torical sedimentations of the American experience will help to answer the 
question of the economic success, adaptability and social stability of 
American popular culture production. It will also explain how these 
advantages buttressed the energizing dynamism of American pe1for-
mance styles over time. Indeed by identifying popular sovereignty as the 
sociopolitical engine and disestablishment as an empowering, stabilizing 
force of the encompassing cultural project, we have a first and prelimi-
nary answer to our question: the success of American popular culture lies 
not in any one of its individual formal or aesthetic properties, but in its 
overall design which is that of a consciously constructed, liberal, and 
popular New World utopia. This utopia materializes and manifests itself 
first and foremost as the first radical, unimpeded market economy which 
set free, as Joyce Appleby has shown, remarkable entrepreneurial ener-
gies of common people. This propulsive energy of New World popular 
culture production - this will be the most comprehensive answer - may 
best be explained along the lines of an American exceptionalism folded 
into a neo-liberal market economy that has after the end of the Cold War 
become a global force. Whether the classic claims of an American excep-
tionalism are spurious or legitimate, mythical or real is beside the point. 
What counts is how and why it works - at home and now around the 
world - in making the commodities of this cultural market so exception-
ally successful. 
Since the l~gic of the American system vests all political authority in 
the basically egalitarian sovereign "we the people," the state or nation 
pursues no cultural project of its own. The absence of a national cultural 
purpose does not mean that the liberal arena or "free" market in which 
cultural production occurs and the public sphere in which its meanings 
are negotiated are a level playing field or a neutral ground ; instead all 
popular cultures, whether countercultural, regional, ethnic, subcultural, 
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middle class or hegemonic, are bound up with existing power strnctures 
and are tied into social and political struggle. Throughout the ages, Bern-
hard Fabian tells us, marshaling much African evidence, popular culture 
was used by the weak, the marginali zed and powerless as an instrument 
to carve out spaces or "moments of freedom" (Fabian). Again the Amer-
ican story diverges from European models and follows its own logic. 
Fabian's understanding of popular-as-adversarial is accurate for highly 
stratified societi es with a strong establishment, either court, clergy or 
bourgeoisie, in place. In such stratified settings, as Roger Chartier notes, 
the notion of the popular emerged as a "category of the learned" 
(Chartier), or, pace Johnson, as a defensive label of the ruling classes for 
the socially other. Into the term "popular" the European rnling order 
packed all its hostile, condescending or nostalgic perceptions of the 
licentious and dangerous classes . In the U.S., however, where popular 
culture rested on the consent of the governed, the concept of the popular 
lacked these projections, as Webster noted. And the guarantee of free 
speech made, at least in theory, Dr. Johnson's class-bound fear of a dis-
senting or licentious mob quite unnecessary. Indeed, later grass roots 
populism would become one of the driving forces in American politics, 
left or right. What has been most confusing for European observers was 
the fact that the articulation of dissent enjoyed a popular legitimation. It 
was part and parcel of that early myth of consensus and hence integral to 
the working of its system. In short, for an important semantic marker of 
the political rhetoric of the young republic the charges were reversed. In 
the U.S . not the concept of a popular, but that of an elite culture emerged 
as a hostile category of Jacksonian common man, and it fill ed an adver-
sarial slot within a middling, contentious and egalitarian democracy. 
Indeed, high culture began in the U.S. with a legitimation crisis and 
stands to this day under potential "Ideologieverdacht" (Twitchell). In 
keeping With its precarious social position the high culture of the Ameri-
can Renaissance internalized antinomian tendencies which in turn accul-
turated a certain populist streak and set the later stage for the "legitima-
tion of the subversive," as Lionel Trilling put it forty years ago. England, 
where popular culture was associated with subaltern, dangerous and 
insurgent movements, gave us the Birmingham school of cultural studies 
with its class-based theory of popular culture. In Johnson's England Pop-
ular Culture Studies would develop into a displaced substitute for 
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Marxism, as Fredric Jameson quips (Jameson 1995). ft was bound into 
the saga of a class struggle agajnst those above. With the emergence of 
new class divisions during industrialization America imported the 
rhetoric of class, but most American "class struggles" have ended in a 
new commercial balance. And American popular cul ture may have had 
something to do with it. Particularly when articulating dissent, popular 
culture has tended - in the long run - to reinforce and stabilize the basi-
cally exceptional logic and the immanence of the American system. 
Werner Sombart's answer to the question of why there is no socialism in 
America was that it shipwrecked on apple pie and steak. I would argue 
that it failed to crack open the immanent stability of the American 
system, and instead was absorbed and coopted by it while the system 
itself adjusted to the new challenges. Dissent is a legitimate, even neces-
sary, part of a system of checks and balances. Indeed, the system learns 
from such illssent. Any citizen may criticize the system from within in 
order to improve its problem solving capacity, but should not cross the 
frontier into the world of an "alien" and "un-Ame1ican" di sloyalty. The 
basic loyalty to the constantly learning system is also the litmus test of an 
American exceptionalism. Hence the dialectical relationship between 
hegemonic power and popular culture is contained within the U.S. and 
hence is marked by more complicated, even contradictory, political shifts 
and social reversals depending on time and place than in Europe with its 
more radical and system-breaking ideological cleavages . Tt is remarkable 
that the American Consti tution outlasted a series of European constitu-
tional revolutions in France, Germany and Italy. A key term here is the 
quintessentially American notion of a "realignment" to adjust what Hunt-
ington called its promise of disharmony or the "IVI-gap," between ideals 
and institutions. A second notion is that of cooptation and inclusion, 
which allows what Hollinger calls " the widening the circle of we," i.e. 
the cirCle of ri ghts and of commodities, of citizens and of consumption. 
Are there not examples of popular culture in the U.S., say in the sixties, 
that could be called adversarial or subversive? Certainly, but these have 
less to do with their popular than their ethnic or particularist provenance 
and are driven by indigenous, subcultural, traditional, but rarely by pop-
ular motives. Popular energy has often attacked inequities and faul ts 
within the system, but rarely challenged its logic or wanted to. Popular 
cultural energy may well arise in an adversarial spirit and proceed to 
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hij ack the signs and symbols of everyday life. It may then purposely dis-
place icons of power into new, regional, ethnic or countercultural frames 
of reference (Frank). It is hardly an accident that Herbert Marcuse formu-
lated his notion of "repressive tolerance" in the U.S . Though the term 
was sometimes misunderstood as a calculated hegemonic strategy it does 
capture the uncanny ability of the two-pronged American liberalism to 
domesticate difference, cornmodify ethnic particularism and incorporate 
political dissent (Zelizer, Frank). Indeed, the free exercize of self-critical 
dissent, particularly the jeremiadic kind, of which American popular cul-
ture literally overflows, is one of the quasi-foundational American habits 
of the heart (Shiffrin) which tends in the long run to reinforce the imma-
nence of its system. 10 
As this article will argue, it is misleading to read the situative hijacking 
of signifiers that American popular culture ritually engages in as a adver-
sari al or destabilizing su·ategy. lt makes more sense to see it as a constant 
realignment and expansion of the American system, helping to buttress 
both its political and cultural order by the cooptation of dissent. The tacit 
background assumption of the system of checks and balances, as James 
Madison understood it, was the realignment of creedal passions of a free 
people, hence it worked toward the harmony of an ever larger system. 
The cumulative effect of the emerging popular culture is the creation of a 
multiculturally seasoned culture industry, which is quite as systemic as 
are the liberal utopias which inspire it. Madison, Jay and Hamilton cre-
ated the political basis for a unique dream machine that would go of 
itself. 
And yet, Jacque Lang's knee-jerk reaction is understandable. When 
observed from outside the U.S., American popular culture appears first 
10. Stuart Hall's warning that popular culture constitutes not only an arena of resistance, but also of con-
sent, is in the American case of si ngular relevance. The transfonnative power of the American system, that of 
turning dissent, be it cultural or political. into economic consent is from a European angle remarkable and 
exceptional (Storey, 160). Even the d iscipline of Cultural S tudies is affected by such a transatlantic commodi-
fication. Since America in the words of Richard Hofstadter docs not have ideologies, bm is one, all un-Amer-
ican " ideologies" or religions, when transported to Ameri ca, are dbarrncd and rendered doctrinally weak by 
the dis-establishment clause of the First Amendment which says "Thou shalt not establish ruling docui nes 
besides Americanism." In the popular rront period of rhe New Deal Marxists tried to pass off conununism as 
the belier Amc1icanism. The transatlantic passage or British Cultural Studies to America has resulted in a 
suhtlc process of depoliticization (Ostendo1f , L995b). 
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and foremost as a commodified industry. However wrong Adorno may 
have been about an individual item such as jazz (which he confused with 
popular music), his verdict holds that American popular culmre as a total 
project and as an industry when seen from the outside tends to be as 
immanent and stable as the political culture which supports it 
(Adomo/Horkheimcr). 11 Moments and spaces of freedom are possible, 
but these are caught in the webs of a much larger economic design which 
pursues its own policy and inexorable, one-dimensional logic. This is 
particularly true of those segments of popular culture that, after surviving 
in a competitive market, have become an economic success and have 
entered a consolidation phase of professionalization and commodifica-
tion. Indeed, the assumption that the ritualized transgression of Rock' n ' 
Roll or oflce-T's rap are inherently "radical" or "transgressive" may turn 
out to be one of the chief miscalcul ations of the Popular Culture Studies 
cohort (Ostendorf 1995b, Frank, passim). 
If from a non-American perspective we take for granted that hegemony 
of the culture industry and the entrepreneurial reach or imperial design of 
its commodities, it ought to be all the more puzzling why its icons and 
ritual transgressions are so popular among the down and out in other 
countries. What explains the magical power of their representational 
tease? For "even people who are being shamefully abused by the 
emerging global system yearn for what it seems to promise them," 
William Greider writes with a sense of wonder (Rosenblatt, 30). The 
answer lies in the nature of that design which combines an individualized 
promise of liberation to customers with the stability of an immanent 
belief system. While popular culture has never been identical or cotermi-
nous with this design, it has received its vital energies from it. Let us first 
look at what Perry Miller called the "innermost propulsion" of the 
"American Creed" and figure out how its dynamic logic has rendered its 
culture so popular. 
I I. There is a renewed inlercsl in the problem and process of commodilica1ion. James W. Cook, in a 
review of Bluford Adams' E P/uribus Barnum: '/11e C real Shuwma11 & the Makiug uf U.S. Popular Cu/111re, 
Minneapol is, 1997 righ1ly insists !hat we must understand "Barnum's exhibitions, ins1itu1ions and celebrity as 
market-driven, publicly-consumed commodilics, each one carefully managed by the showman ... " and, one 
might add, by the author o l' "Thc Arl of Money-Gelling." "Mass Marketing and Cul lurnl Hislory: The Case of 
P.T. Barnum," A111erica11 Q11ar1erly 51 , I (March 1999), 175- 186. 
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II. American Popular Culture: A Pragmatic Charter of Behavior 
Rule of law & habeas corpus. The deepest layer of the American creed 
holds the tradition of the rule of law and of habeas corpus. The American 
dissidents attacked the British king for the breach of these "ancient 
English rights." The royal breach legitimized their secession that created 
the Republic: a truly foundational act of resistance. Thomas Paine put it 
well: the "king as law" was replaced by the "rule of law" (Rogin, 82), thus 
radically redefining the notion of a body politic. To wit, the rule of law 
entered the American design of a well-run republic on a consenting and 
dissenting note that proved to be effective in the creation of individual 
legal self-confidence and of rights talk. The belief in the rule of law and, 
subsequently, in legal proceduralism was democratized and popularized 
in the early Republic (Wood). It has over time given to America six times 
more lawyers per capita than France, three times more than Germany, and, 
in combination with an individualized sense of tort and the privatization of 
punitive damages, has fed a hungry culture of litigation. Each year Amer-
ican law schools produce more lawyers than the total number of1egal pro-
fessionals working in Japan (Lipset, 49-50). Perry Miller observed the 
"rise of a legal mentality" in his The Life of the Mind in America (1965) 
and Lawrence M. Friedman claims with some justice that "life in modem 
America ... is a vast, diffuse school oflaw" (Papke, 3). 
The national preoccupation with the rule of law has energized the icono-
graphy and nmntives of popular culture in myriad ways (Porsdam). The 
important role of the court as a narrative arena is apparent in the Western, 
as is the prominence of the rhetoric of juridical proceduralism in its plots. 
The choreography of the classic western pivots on the boundary line 
between legal and extralegal territories and behaviors, and its ethos sup-
ports the right of the individual to break when necessary "bad" law and to 
take the "good" law into his own hands. Court scenes are constitutive of 
its plots, and the sheriff has over time become a regular of national cen-
tral casting. Lynch law, when inspired by racial presuppositions, charts 
the dark and violent side of such legalistic entitlements on the fault line 
between civilization and wilderness, or between Jaw and order. 
In our time American television has developed any number of court 
dramas and court sitcoms, most notably Perry Mason. The eager partici-
pation of the American public in the legal proceduralism of the OJ. 
Simpson trial and in the legal hairsplitting in the Monica Lewinsky affair 
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have baffled European audiences. Since Monicagate CNN has run a pro-
gram called "The Burden of Proof' which is exclusively concerned with 
procedural questions.12 And other such popular programs keep cropping 
up at regular intervals (Judge Judy, Divorce Court, Moral Court, Judge 
Hatchet). How may one explain the exceptional status of the j ustices of 
the American Supreme Court as public figures? In Europe the names of 
chief justices are not generally known, and ft:w people know what they 
actually do. The appointment of American chief justices constitutes a 
political event of the first order, as the failed nomination of Judge Bork or 
the appointment of Clarence Thomas have demonstrated. Key social 
anxieties such as the so-called "aids scare" are domesticated and regu-
lated by running them through a legal register as in the film "Philadel-
phia." Only in American could two law professors Paul Bergman and 
Michael Asimov write a handbook for law movie buffs, Reel Justice. 
They list more than 110 box office courtroom fi lms, not counting B-
movies or Westerns. They rate them by assigning one to four gavels, not 
for their quality as films, but for their accuracy of legal analysis and of 
trial practice (Bergman/ Asimov). There is a vast popular audience for the 
daily practice of the rule of law. 
The story of how law and popular culture mesh would not be complete 
without a strong dissenting tradition, a legal heresy movement, that found 
an "undue respect for law" misguided and even dangerous. It too goes 
back to the founding myths which after the Declaration of Indpendence 
were buttressed by a strong suspicion of any central power. Henry David 
Thoreau called for a civil disobedience based on individual conscience 
and found that the instruments of legal proceduralism were concentrated 
in the hands of the powerful and co1rnpt. What one may call the lack-of-
faith-tradition was carried on by various radical groups into the new cen-
tury, and found a strong revival in the Civil Rights and Black movements. 
Legali sm was a tool in the hands of white suppressors, said the Black Pan-
12. TV court d ramas have not been as easily exportable to continental Europe as have other s ircoms, hut 
!hey are now run on commercial channels. U.S. Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski recalls his fascination as an 
immigrant to America in J 963 watching T1.,efve /\ 11gry M e11 ( 1957) where Henry Fonda who plays the lone 
d issenting voice in a jury of twelve manages to rum the verdict around. Kozinski decided to go for a career in 
law (Bergman/Asimov. xvii-xviii). The s pirit of law in the Gennan TV series "Derrick" rests in a paternalistic 
and patriarchal police officer, the juridical equivalent of Helmuth Kohl. "Dcni ck 's" predecessor was known 
as "Der Alie," a name rhe public used for Adenauer. Nor surprisingly the series is popular in China and Japan. 
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thers, and " the system" readily obliged by providing cases to prove it. The 
Rodney King trial made visible these skeletons in the closets of a con-upt 
system as does the on-going case of Abu Mumia Jamal on death-row. One 
would in fact suspect that a lack of faith in the rule of law ought to charac-
terize the marginalized, ghettoized and forgotten minorities. Not neces-
sarily. In the courtroom of the public they too used the instruments of the 
rule of law to be heard and counted. Patricia Williams records that despite 
their experience as victims of a racist legal practice, the black folk have 
kept alive a "semi-religious source of hope," that grounds in the abstract 
"rights-talk" of the Constitution and the Emancipation Proclamation 
(Porsdam, 16). On the other side of the political spectrum right-wing orga-
nizations and militias seem today less obsessed with guns than with laws. 
There is a right-wing subculture of proceduralist ri ghts talk, a constitu-
tional fundamentalism defending personal liberties against an encroaching 
"system" be it the federal state or a world conspiracy called ZOG (Zionist 
Occupational Government). And at both extremes such rights talk is folded 
into the rhetoric of patriotism. Indeed, it is the strong emphasis on person-
alized rights as a defense against centralized tyranny which has fired the 
popular and patriotic imagination of common Americans. And this 
promise of legal empowerment of the lone individual is heard - through 
the agency of American films - not only in the US but all over the world. 
The Soviet dissident Joseph Brodsky relates that his conversion to 
Western civil rights came after watching German language versions of 
Ame1ican Tarzan and Zorro films in Soviet Russia. The Soviets had con-
fiscated this contraband after the war in Berlin and had released the films 
with Russian subtitles on the assumption that they were too trivial to 
matter. But according to Brodsky they carried the message of the heroic 
struggle of individual fighters against collective oppression into the hearts 
of many young Russians. 13 According to the London Observer Serbian 
students were arrested, manhandled and beaten by Belgrade riot police 
and, to add insult to injury, were given a mock trial. When one of the stu-
dents asked for a defense lawyer he was told: "you have been watching too 
many American movies" (Gitlin, 1992). Such liberal dreams of the rule 
of law are highly exportable to beleaguered individuals al l around the 
world. 
13. Personal communication from Werner Sollors. 
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The Beloved "Moral" Community. The second archeological layer 
of the American belief system holds the idea of a protestant-republican 
beloved community that was conceived in the spirit of a morally sanc-
tioned dissent and subsequently stabilized by voluntary associations of 
like-minded individuals. The Mayflower Compact of 1620 provided the 
model for a voluntaristic communitarian contract of dissenters. The idea 
of a voluntary and hence beloved moral community constitutes a strong 
fibre of the American social fabric spun by John Winthrop on the "Ara-
bella" in 1630, a vested interest in community and in a "civill body poli-
tick" which, though forever in crisis, is ali ve and well today (Smelser & 
Alexander, 1999). Indeed, the current discourses loosely called "cornmu-
nitarianism" are popular reactions to the alleged or real decline of com-
munity or of voluntaiism using the rhetoric of the jeremiad and the strate-
gies of quasi-religious mobilization. 14 Civic-mindedness and the sense of 
public stewardship of the moral individual are the civic or social capital 
accumulated according to the biblical adage: "where much is given, 
much is demanded." The Protestant heritage of individual accountability 
adds a moral component to the rights of the individual mentioned above, 
indeed legitimating the moral necessity of legal proceduralism. Only the 
fusion of legal proceduralism with the idea of the moral community on 
the one hand and the responsible individual on the other begins to explain 
the popular fundamentalist passion of a Kenneth Staff or the rigourous 
moral conservati sm of the religious ri ght vis a vis issues such as sexual 
transgression, abortion and school prayer. The focus on accountability 
may help to expla in why even in the world of corporate ethics American 
courts tend to hold the individual agents responsible, not the corporation, 
as Europeans would. 15 Accountabi lity against community and the broad 
definition of the common good would help to answer the question why 
14. Robert Putnam, " Bowling Alone: America's Declin ing Social Capital," Jo11mal of Democracy, 6 
January 1995, 65-78. Michael Walzer, "Rescuing Civil Society," /Jisse111 (Winter 1999) 62-7. Amitai Etzioni 
has been trying to export his communitarian reform lo Europe without much success. The idea is ton Amer-
ican. For a trenchant criticism of these positions Jean Cohen "Docs Voluntruy Association Make Democracy 
Work?" in Smelser and Alexander, 263-292. 
15. See Lohncrt, passim. on the remarkable difference between Europe and America in corporate ethics. 
One reason given for the higher remuneration of American CEOs is this risk nf personal accountabili ty. Alas, 
in America only CEOs, not workers arc compensated for the increased risk of job insecurity. Conversely, 
punitive damages are also individuali7.ed and privatized. 
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among Western democracies only the U.S. holds on to the death penalty 
(Holmes, 200). Under the aegis of the belief in a novus ordo saeclorwn 
wruch every dollar note reconfirms, community would acquire a reli-
gious legitimation, that is, the secular American purpose was soon fired 
by a sense of religious passion. It sanctified the project of American 
society and gave to its founding myths a religious underpinning (Geb-
hardt), thereby stabilizing its immanent logic. 
Any number of classic American natTatives are devoted to the mainte-
nance or the revitalization of the beloved community when threatened by 
deviancy, corruption, crime and some evil "other." And these narratives 
as a rule call upon the moral sense of individuals to right the wrongs. 
Classic examples include the films " Mr. Deed goes to Town," "Mr. Smith 
goes to Washington," and "The Grapes of Wrath." The civil religious pat-
tern is stable today and trickles down into most unlikely plots. In a 1993 
film, "Sister Act II," Whoopi Goldberg plays a former nun who left the 
Franciscan order to become a black popular Hollywood entertainer. 
Mother Superior who also heads a small community college begs her to 
rejoin the order temporarily to help save the college from going under. 
Due to low ranking the College is in danger of being closed down by the 
business manager of the bishop (the central power) who is both mean and 
male. She accepts and begins teaching music to a non-responsive multi-
ethnic student body. Thi s popular black nun in a mendicant order mobi-
lizes the student body to win first prize in a choir competition in Holly-
wood by doing a ripping popular version of a Negro spiritual. Campus 
dissent is folded into the community effort when the campus Muslim 
does the lead vocal. Together they fight the power and save the Commu-
nity College from going belly-up. 
Zorro and the Lone Ranger are typical community-saving types, stock 
characters in a long line of national central casting, wruch may be well 
extended into the present time to include Erin Brockovich, Rambo, and 
the Terminalor. 16 Indeed the notions of community or union have 
achieved a sacrosanct status after the Civil War. Lincoln invoked that 
sense of national community with hi s domestic metaphor that a "house 
16. In Peter Hyams' last fi lm "End of Days" Schwarzenegger saves the world from Satan. He is in search 
o f a vi rgin with whom to father a future satanic ruler of the world. Schwarzenegger's name is Jericho Crane, 
J.C. for shorl, and al Ihe end of the film he sacri fi ces his life for the virginity of the endangered woman. 
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divided cannot stand" and in the Gettysburg Address provided the 
national prayer for that occasion. Clearly the Civil War with its rich array 
of divisive sub-themes (racism, miscegenation, secession, fratricide) has 
energized this communitarian source for popular civic desires and anxi-
eties. Again, the utopian dream of community is highly exportable to an 
increasingly divisive world. 
Liberalism of the Market and of the Self. The third layer in the national 
creed fuses elements drawn from the traditions of the French and Scottish 
enlightenments into a dual project. Classic American liberalism couples a 
keen sense of universal civil rights with a laissez faire economic order. 
One pole of the Enlightenment project tends toward ever greater 
autonomy of the individual and the other pushes the unlimited expansion 
of a world of goods and their cornmodification. What Marx called "das 
Liebeswerben der Waren" ("the erotic tease of commodities") fills the 
space between the desirous individual and the market. Theodore Dreiser 
used this erotic synergy in Sister Carrie who would rather lose her virtue 
than do without the promises of goods. Translated to popular culture, this 
leads to a focus on individual agents, their individualized desires, and 
their quest for autonomy on the one hand and to the evolution of a culture 
industry on the other. America, in the words of Adorno, represents the 
first radical bourgeois "Tauschgesellschaft" in which the customer is 
king and in which a new dialectic between average individuals and com-
modities is allowed to develop without the restraints so typical of Euro-
pean markets. 
As a hegemonic ideology classic liberalism acquired its recognizable 
dialectic between 1820 and 1860, precisely the period when popular cul-
ture emerged. In liberalism, rights are lodged in individuals not in groups 
or estates. Jacksonian democracy injected a rigorous egalitarianism of 
chances which was then orchestrated by a laissez faire liberal economy. 
The latter lets each individual find his/her own place in the hierarchy of 
an achievement-oriented social darwinism. "Let the best man win," this 
is the motto of the Virginian and it resonates in a general achievement 
orientation of public rhetoric all over America. Today the term "work-
fare" speaks to that sentiment. To liberate the individual and, at the same 
time, to harness established powers, be these religious or governmental -
this is the dual thrust of the First Amendment which guarantees the free 
exercise of religion to every individual, but forbids the establishment of 
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any corporate religious power or its interference with individual 
rights.17 This freedom-from-and-freedom-to-model is crucial for an 
explanation of, first republican, then liberal "popular" behavior and may 
be used, by way of analogy, for the balance of any other freedom and 
fear, i.e. the freedom of ethnic belonging vs. the fear of the establishment 
of ethnic power. To negotiate and achieve a balance between these two 
freedoms energizes the majority of American public discourses from 
States ' rights over affirmative action to abortion. 
In literature or film an endless set of stories is devoted to the fate (and 
the rights) of the lone individual making his/her way within an economic 
system. Though the market may bear the label free, the folk imagination, 
echoing Darwin, has compared it more often to a wilderness, even to a 
jungle. Horatio Alger, Hucklebe1Ty Finn, Sister CaITie, Scarlett O' Hara 
are classical character types coping with adversity in a world defined by 
a liberal market economy. The freedom of the market is shot through , 
pace P. T. Barnum, W.C. Fields and Groucho Marx, by chance, huck-
sterism, corruption and humbug. These latter dangers are inevitable side-
effects of a free market. Its built-in penchant for corruption helps to 
account for the aforementioned size of the legal industry which protects 
the 1ights of the individual from such chance and adversity. Is it sur-
prising that Social Darwinism which naturalizes an economic separation 
into winners and losers should have had far greater appeal as a public 
philosophy in industrializing, liberal America than in imperial, class-
bound Britain? Fantasies of personal rights, of total freedom and 
autonomy, of the imperial self are the theme songs of popular culture, 
particularly on its substantial libertarian side. 18 They are also the 
breeding ground of those colossal revenge fantasies so typical of Amer-
ican TY fare when the rights of autonomous individuals are wronged. In 
short, cultural as well as political authority rests in the individual whom 
17. Though the Fina Amendment binds only the Federal Government, it has had a deep impact on the poli-
tical culture. 
18. William Recs-Mogg, a former Labour Home Secretary, joined Mick Jagger in a talk show: "I was 
fasc inated by the way all his arguments turned on those classic propositions that people ought to be absolutely 
free and that there ought to he as li tt le government as possible. As he put forward these views which were so 
much against the grain of lhe currently fashionable left-wing ideology, I suddenly realised rhat Mick Jagger 
was in essence a right-wing libertarian. Straight John Stuart Mill!" quoted in Derck Taylor. It wus twenty 
years ago today. New York: Fireside 1987, 120. 
., 
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liberalism invests with civil rights and the economic arena to fight it out. 
This dialectic of freedom and chance is fetching for "gambling" audi-
ences all over the world. 
Populism and the Common Man. The fourth strand emerged in the 
young republic, partially as a reaction to the formation of the new polit-
ical and social establishment of "gentlemen of property and standing." 
Populism since then has been the oppositional ostinato of American pop-
ular (and high) culture to the powers that be, a popular protest against 
hierarchy and against old, established power. Populism served to bundle 
some of the previous "creedal passions" (Huntington, 86-7) and gave 
them a popular, anti-intellectual twist. Characteri.stic of this Jacksonian 
movement is a deep distrust of anything exalted, elitist and hierarchical, 
an oppositional sentiment which has inspired and mobilized both the Left 
and Right in the course of American history. Indeed populism and a pop-
u 1 ar anti-intellectualism are so deeply embedded in the American identity 
that they have become, to modify Richard Hofstadter's words, its transid-
eological base. Both Left and Right proudly proclaim the common man 
as king and claim to speak for him. This sentiment encouraged the cre-
ation of a popular culture industry, and it has given us among other things 
the Popular Culture Association or Alunmi Professors of English who 
proudly herald the triumph of adcult and materialism in American culture 
(Twitchell). The consolidation of the Republic gave the emergence of 
popular culture a latent political advantage which it lacked in other 
Western cultures. In contrast to Europe, high culture in America was 
assigned the role of the "adversarial" minority culture which needed spe-
cial nurture, attention and uplift (Levine). James Fenimore Cooper and 
Hawthorne were resigned to the fact that American culture was subject to 
the tyranny of the common man and often succumbed to the market. 
President John Quincy Adams therefore hastened to express a preference 
for the American minstrel show as opposed to European opera. Henry 
James deplored the absence of class-bound cultural traditions and fled to 
England, where he recorded in countless novels how well-ordered Euro-
pean high culture was imported and financed by the illgotten gains of 
industrial capital, a cultural uplift and a search for order (Bigsby). It is 
therefore of particular interest to observe that American popular culture 
became the adversarial culture of the European left after WWll. 
Strategies of Improvement. The emergence of popular culture early 
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in the 19th century must be seen in conjunction with the reform move-
ment. Reform in tmn was buttressed by the popular religious energies let 
loose by the second Great Awakening. The latter had developed strat-
egies of awakening in order to mobilize new "customers" in the growing 
religious market created by the new expanding frontier. Such awakenings 
promoted self-realization through emotional rituals of search for a better 
life. They permitted emotional and expressive externalization and 
enhanced audience participation and interaction. Ever since then Amer-
ican rituals of self-improvement and search have tended to be noisy and 
carnivalesque. During and after the Second Awakening professional spe-
cialists in the art of mobilizing reform such as Charles G. Finney began to 
market their services for the benefit of the public interest (Williams). The 
energies of such awakenings were focu sed on the most important person 
in American culture , the paying customer, a fact which tends to make vir-
tuall y all culture in America popular including Jenny Lind, the Met or 
King Tut. 19 Is it surprising then that the paying audience in early Amer-
ican theatre was called " the sovereign." The emerging popular market 
was stabilized by the socialized tyranny of expectation of the emerging 
mass audience. This focus on the desires of the customer encouraged the 
emergence of a consumption ethos in cultural production which occu1Ted 
earlier and grew faster and stronger than in Europe (Hanis, Adorno). The 
Second Awakening buttressed the belief in the wisdom of the common 
man by harnessing religious energies to the goals of de-h ierarchization 
and individuation. One example may suffice: Making ministers depen-
dent on church community approval and promoting the beli ef in the uni-
versal apostolate were emancipatory goals which could easily be trans-
lated into the political and cultural spheres. This subterranean populist 
mood with its roots in religious passion has given American popular cul-
ture an early moral advantage over high culnire, an advantage which was 
firmly establi shed by the time of the Astor Place riot in May 1849. Pop-
ulist energies and characters fi ll the American stage, notably Indian 
Melodrama and the Minstrel Show. Populism runs like a theme song 
19. Museums gel s1ar1ed as commercial as we ll as eduealional undertakings, but invariably they had 10 be 
satisfy the first desire-entertainme nt - in order to buuress the educational and commercial goals. This is what 
Charles Willson Peale and P.T. Barnum, America's museum pioneers, taught the nation. For a museum to he 
successful ils mummies must learn 10 dance. 
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through American fiction and film from The Virginian. to "Forrest 
Gump."20 Again such populism fires the imagination of marginal groups 
all over the world particularly in conjunction with its strong libertarian 
offshoots. 
Instrumental Reason & Pragmatic Reform. Any design for political 
action that is triggered by the charters of behavior enumerated above 
would inevitably generate a strong belief in instrumental reason coupled 
with pragmatic reform. The hope for improvement has anchored in pop-
ular culture a willingness to reform both as a personal and a public 
agenda.21 The focus on individual agency accounts for the fact that the 
autobiography sections in American bookstores are so extensive and that 
the personal journal has replaced research papers in some college 
courses. Not only did America develop over time a wide range of per-
sonal help and popular reform literatures, but to mobilize the public into 
a reformist mind-frame became one of the most important skills of 
anyone operating in the public arena. Moreover, the belief in reform 
through instrumental reason has given America a trust in short range 
social engineering, in quick social therapy and technological innovation 
which holds firm until today.22 Hence "problem solving" and "quick 
solutions" are a common theme in popular culture which is full of fixers 
and soterological figures (like Shane) who welcome the challenge of a 
problematical situation in order to better things for the common good. 
Quite early a popular magazine for the dissemination of useful knowl-
edge came on the scene: Scientific American (1840sff) a nati onal medium 
of problem solving. Problem solvers and inventors such as Edison or 
Ford would in time become popular folk heroes and would in turn found 
the first industri al museums for the "entertainment and instruction of the 
20. The common man was also lampooned for his cussedness and yokelism. Currently a new populist re-
sentment has revived plebiscites as a form of direct government, particularly in Cal iforni u where a series of 
far-reaching propositions have made governance difficult. The populist temptation explains the partial success 
of simplifiers such as Pat Buchanan and Ross Pero t, a self-proclaimed yoke l. 
21. Clairbome, the first governor of Louisiana, reported to Washington that while the local French Creoles 
were only interested in having a good time and dancing Americans were interested in economic and civic 
improvement. 
22. Manfred Henningson writes in Der Fall Amerika (MUnchcn 1974) "Die spontanc Machbarkeit von Zivi-
lisation gehiirt zum gcnuinen Erfahrungsbestand Amcrikas." 152. By comparison Germans tend to be trad itio-
nalists and Luddites. Heidegger f"onnulatcd the deepest caveat against American technical utopianism by cal-
ling it "katastrophenhafl" (ri fe with catastrophe), a senti ment still shared by the funda mentalist Left and Right. 
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people" (Julius Rosenwald quoted by Skramstad). Ford created the 
Edison Institute in Dearborn.23 Advertising, the rhetoric of thi s commer-
cial ethos, has fallen in line and has made full use of the soteriological 
and quick-fix yearnings of the American public and therefore practices, 
as James Twitchell has it, a "rhetoric of salvation." A reform ethos 
strengthens the belief that "culture" is not so much inherited as made. 
Hence even tradition is reinvented through the filter of present desire as 
may be witnessed in Colonial Williamsburg or Disneyland. 
Multiculturalism. The simplified moral universe which was devel-
oped in populist Jacksonian America was pluralized again by America's 
ethnic fragmentation. The multiethnic peopling of nineteenth and twen-
tieth century America led to an interesting process: the absorption of the 
incoming cultural, ethnic, racial inputs into one unified "immigrant 
American" frame, an Aufhebung of the ethnic other in an emerging, loose 
American mainstream defined and shaped by a popular cultural industry. 
This absorption was accompanied by strong nativist reactions and there-
fore involved conscious processes of passing, of travesty, and parody and 
unconscious processes of creolization enhanced by a structural amnesia. 
Ethnic groups simply forgot those normative particul ars of their tradi-
tional culture that did not "work" in America. Indeed, it was in the long-
range interest to forget in order not to call out the nativist dogs. Structural 
amnesia served to slpugh off counterproductive ethnic traditions. Ger-
mans gave up their dual bread or "warm beer" culture, Itali ans forgot 
about "al dente", for neither group could sell it to the others. Consciously 
or unconsciously a levelling of ethnically specific cultures occuned 
towards a marketable common denominator that would appeal beyond 
no1mative ethnic horizons to a trans- or panethnic audience. The 
resulting common denominator of tolerable ethnic otherness was further-
23. Some critics of American museum culture have vjewed the professionalisarion and inward rurn of 
museums in the 20th century as a deviation from their original purpose (Skramstad). The boom of museums 
after 1960 indicates a return to the older entertainment-cum-educational model, now under the aegis of "edu-
cational experience." Miraculous solutions to social prohlcms continue to be popular. The wonderdrug 
Prozac, Whitebook says, was welcomed because it made psychoanalysis (and Freud) s11pe11111ous. Cf. Joel 
Whitebook, "Psychoanalysis and Democracy," Dissent (Spring 1999), 59-66. And Viagra's success speaks for 
itself. Suell outgrowths of popular fantasy as Science Fiction and Scientology couple rational mastery with a 
libertarian marker economy. These projects are energized by a belie f in inslrumcnUtl reason, in ego-centered 
networks and a promise to fix things. T. Jackson Lears and James Twitchell consider commodities a modern 
form of magic (Lears, 40-75). 
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more folklorized (in the abovementioned populist and market-oriented 
manner), so that today we have before us a conge1ie of no fault, trickle 
down ethnic cultures of celebration domesticated through the filter of 
commodification. Oktoberfests in Cincinnati or Lukenbach, Texas may 
serve as an example. This folkloric absorption enhances the Arminian 
turn in multiculturalism and its ruling credo of celebration: I'm ok, 
you're ok. 
The specific turns that urbanization or industrialization took in 
America would be unthinkable without the influx of immigrant groups 
from 1825 to the present. Hence the experience of "cultural" ethnicity is 
peculiarly American, particularly when coupled with the essentializing 
energy of populism within a civil rights universal frame. Though inter-
ethnic conflict and a coupling of ethnicity with class was constitutive of 
America's peculiar, ethnically staggered class system (eth-class), there 
was also the long-range hope of moving on up and closing ranks with a 
generalized, universal American culture. At the same time this common 
or mainstream culture had become, over the years, heavily ethnicized. 
When Selznic was asked what music he planned to use for the all-Amer-
ican epic "Gone With the Wind" his answer was: "good old Jewish 
music." By 1938 it had become the American popular standard.24 
Consequently, the daily experience of an ongoing "antagonistic accul-
turation" (George Devereux) grew itself into a popular cultural main-
stream. The cultural give-and-take across ethnic and racial boundaries, 
involving intermarriage and cultural mixing, became standard fare for 
sketches or jokes on the popular stage. Indeed it may be the motor behind 
the popularity of American stand-up comedy which is today being copied 
everywhere in the world (ousting indigenous traditions such as Kabarett 
in Germany). The adventure of ethnic jockeying for a better place under 
the universal sun may not be peculiar to America, yet the size of its immi-
grant population at a crucial stage during the period of industrialization 
and urbanization and the promise of its liberal naturalization law within a 
racialized public sphere kept the theme of assimilation and of nativism 
constantly on the public agenda. Therefore the double consciousness 
both of ethnic marginality (wounds) and of ethnic empowerment (entitle-
24. Among the major songwriters there was only one lonely WASP, Cole Porter, and he professed a love 
for African American and Jewish music. 
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ments) is endemic to the American immigrant experience within a liberal 
setup. Another such tradition of the popular stage has explored the code 
switching between alternative identities. America offered its ethnic mem-
bers the option of becoming "a real Yankee," as Abraham Cahan's Yekl 
has it, or to remain an orthodox Jew with many partial and, often comic, 
compromises in-between. Role and code switching between Anglo or 
ethnic identities gave rise to rich ethnic comedy, to interethnic and inter-
racial joking and to the sort of hazing that is part and parcel of any initia-
tion ritual. The ethnic and race boundary with its infinite modes of frag-
mentation or fusion, of passing or of transgression forms a nodal point 
for Ame1ican popular culture formation. More recently gender crossing 
has followed patterns similar to those of ethnic boundary management, 
and it is equally rife with rich themes. Moreover, exploring the bound-
aries between real and virtual spaces and identities is another spin-off 
from this experience. It is therefore no accident that ethnic subgroups the 
world over adopt these strategies and their rhetoric. 
Race: the Blackening of American Culture. For a long time the 
African-American impact on American popular culture, particularly on 
its music, remained a well kept, repressed secret. Ralph Ellison alerted us 
to the invisibility of black culture after the Second World War in his 
novel Invisible Man and in 1970 asked tongue in cheek, "what American 
culture would be like without blacks" (O'Meally, xi). Since then its for-
mative influence has been acknowledged (Lipsitz) . Much earlier the 
Swiss psychologist Carl Gustav Jung tried to alert his American readers 
in 1930 to "your Negroid behavior," an observation that fell on deaf ears 
at the time (Jung). Yet, he was the first to notice that African-American 
rules of pe1formance had seeped into the American popular mainstream 
and into American body language or kinetics. Today, few people would 
deny that contemporary American popular music or dance derives largely 
from Black cultural models (White & White, Price, passim). This has to 
do with the sheer energy of its forms which needs to be explained. 
Black culture acquired its energy from an existential need: to combat 
the social death of slavery. The existential difference to the slave master 
could not be marked using the instruments of politics or economics that 
were available to other whites; only in the largely unattended and unpo-
litical area of culture could blacks carve out spaces of freedom . By cre-
ating "their own" memory culture, albeit of an "Afrique de !'esprit" 
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within the New World, Blacks could hold on to a sense of self. Jn that 
crucial sense, the existence of slavery energized Black cultural produc-
tion in order to mark that difference. This fact has given to New World 
diasporic creoles an existential urgency that other ethnic subcultures have 
lacked. Hence, to E uropean observers in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries black performers seemed to perform as if their life depended on 
it. It did. This helps to identify and understand how Black cultural prac-
tice and performance could become, even in the guise of racist parody, a 
hidden dynamo of American popular culture (Ostendorf, 1979). More-
over, there are next to this subliminal and existential energy moral under-
pinnings which makes it attractive to all marginalized selves or groups 
the world over. Blacks by their very presence, as Ellison argued, were 
after all the guardians of constitutional liberties. 
Professional Afrocentrists claim that African-American forms are con-
tinuities or "survivals" of Africa. This makes little sense. Instead, they 
are constant recreations of African memories to create social spaces of 
freedom in the New World in the crucible of slavery (Price & Price). This 
has given to Afri can-American forms the power and quality of New 
World myth-making and to "American" civil rights issues an urgency 
amplified by the gradual recognition of the wrongs of slavery. The claim 
of black "authenticity or of African origins" is also misguided for the 
simple reason that essentialism would fail to account for the blackening 
of American mainstream culture.25 An essentialist take makes even less 
sense for the fractal, circumatlantic diasporic Africanist syncreti sms in 
Caribbean plantation slavery. Indeed, from its inception African-Amer-
ican culture formation has occmred in a constant negotiation with all 
other ethnic groups including Native Americans.26 The Africanization of 
European styles occurs not as a maintenance or as a survival of "African 
subslances or meanings," but in the mimicry and signifying of a more 
general African attitude towards things - particularly in motor behavior 
and energy management, that is, in perfonnance (Price & Price). 
The Africanization of European material s through performance places 
25. Except of course as a rip-off theory which is very popular among blacks. 
26. Consider the Mardi Gras Indians of New Orleans or the curious mix that has gone into the making of 
Clifton Chenier's version of the Acadien folksong "Jolie Blonde," let alone what he did to "Bon Ton Roule" 
on the accordcon . 
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emphasis on communal, part1c1patory music-making, on style, sound 
quality and the mechanics of delivery. Text or score that constitute the 
major crutches of European performances are decidedly secondary. 
Trombonist Trummy Young used to taunt his copycats "Taint What You 
Do (It's the Way That You Do It)." This performative tradition enhances 
a new interconnectedness: there is in African American popular perfor-
mance an intimate synergy of music and musician, dancer and dance, 
rhythm and bodies - within the frame of a bodily, loose, kinetic, ener-
getic, non-repressive performance. What we witness to this day in the 
ring-shout, in Mardi Gras Indian practice, in the jazz funeral, or during 
the service of a "rocking church" is a unified experience of communal, 
transformative energy. This religious energy over time seeped into Amer-
ican popular culture surreptitiously. Aretha Franklin, James Cleveland, 
and Ray Charles quite openly translated it into the popular musical 
canon. 
Performance s tyles of African-American culture have a transfo1mative 
trajectory, i.e. they are trying to achieve a new level of social or existen-
tial being, either through spirit-possession or community creation. In 
early slave cultures, this meant bringing out "African memories" in the 
dynamics of the ritual. This pattern has settled comfortably in the Amer-
ican "born-again" dynamic of religious rituals. But each Africanizing lib-
eration, if it results in a new form, could be and often was picked up by 
white copyists, most notably in Ragtime and Jazz. Charles Keil writes 
that with each appropriation of a Black musical tradition into a European 
structure of feeling, the new African-American musical self-assertion 
had to become ever more imaginatively African. Hence new African-
American styles were constantly added to the mainstream. This constant 
reinvention of a mythical Africa has made African-American culture ever 
more American in that it followed the quintessentially American trajec-
tory of a quest for literacy, autonomy, and freedom, a constant innovative 
pressure "to make it new." This makes Jazz in my view the one American 
high modernist contribution to world culture.27 
Both the rhythmic and hannonic sense of African American music is 
markedly different with its dominance of percussion, its polymeters, its 
27 . This is a position held by Ralph Ellison and Albert Murray. Cf. the forthcoming book by Robert 
Crundcn on Jazz and Modernism or O'Mcally passim. 
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off-beat phrasing, its overlapping call and response, its propulsive swing, 
its deflationary down-beat, and its blue notes . None of these are "well-
tempered" and meet European expectations. But every single one of 
these individ ual elements has at one time or another sli pped into the 
mainstream of popular musical performance, often under the gui se of 
put-down, comedy or parody. At the time of their crossing of the color 
line they were as a rule identified by WASPish cultmal custodians as 
impure, degenerate and hence dangerous. Elvis Presley's pelvic thrust 
which was censored out of the Ed Sullivan show may ser ve as one such 
threshold crisis (Ostendorf, 1998) . 
Another characteristic of Black performance is the shift between and 
conflation of sacred and profane worlds which adds an interesting 
chapter to the Western secularizati on vs sacralization scenario. The gen-
eral tendency has been towards a merging of ritual styles of performance. 
The use of vernacular styles in church and Black religious styles in con-
cert has accelerated. There has been a simultaneous "vernacularization" 
of religious ritual and a "sacralizati on" of secular performance styles, 
say, when a Black church hymn "We Shall Overcome" becomes the 
national anthem of the Civil Rights movement or when James Brown 
goes into a preacherly frenzy. At this point, "signifying" - the trope of 
tropes in Af1i can-American culture - chimes in. In Black culture actors 
signify on actors, themes signify on themes, genres signify on other 
genres, the secular realm signifies on the sacred . There is a constant 
kinetic and sonic mimesis, most notably in cutting contests that are 
endemic to all communal performances, be they jam sessions or buck 
jumping contests at Jazz funerals. Also, the call-and-response pattern 
may be called a trope of tropes which feeds into a dialogical, conversa-
tional character of black music maki ng. The trope of revision entail s the 
quoting of previous styles. Hence intertextuality, self-referentiality, inli-
tation, parody, and travesty in African-American oral tradition add up to 
what would in Western culture be identified as postmodern (Ostendorf, 
1979). These characteristics, though not unknown in Western music, 
were in their concentration and early occun-ence unique to black popular 
music. 
Last, but not least, African American music-making aims for high den-
sity of performance events within a relatively short musical space. There 
tends to be a profusion of simultaneous musical activities, as if an 
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attempt is being made to fill up every available niche of musical space. 
This may well c01Tespond to the sound ideal of certain West African tra-
ditions that favor collective improvisation of equal instruments (Wilson). 
To this day second line bands in New Orleans avoid division of labor 
between instruments, all are melodic, all are rhythmic, and all are loud -
and they manage to fill a neighborhood with sound. 
These rules of performance have over time been partially absorbed by 
American popular culture and honed by and adapted to a multiethnic 
audience. Second generation American Jews and Italians have been 
instrumental in translating this black energy into mainstream culture. 
This ethnic collusion has made these items irresistible to oppressed 
groups or to individuals around the world trying to break out of their 
shackles. Not only Ghanian asylum seekers in Munich, but Tungusian 
youth in Siberia, Senegalese hip hop groups and German-Turkish adols-
cents in Berlin mimic the playful African-American ritual gestures of 
existential transgression and mock defi ance and create their versions rap, 
hip-hop and break dance. When, after 1960 popular music became part of 
a new teenage life style, these black musical rules of performance and rit-
uals of defiance stood ready to serve that purpose.28 
III. Checks and Balances: the Choreography of Harmony 
Using the constitutional system of checks and balances as a template, I 
propose that these propulsive energies and creedal passions as they 
developed and adjusted in the crucible of an exceptional history are in a 
constant battle of negotiations effecting what Kenneth Burke referred to 
as the "unending conversation" of American culture. The constitutional 
system of checks and balances finds its parallel in the dialogic network of 
28. The Senegalese hip hop group Positive Black Soul has no trnck with African e thnic cmpowcrmcm. 
Hence they would rather not have their records marketed under the African or Senegalese label. but would 
rather be listed in the American hip hop section. "We are not exotic or cloned African monkeys" they protest, 
"but a regular hip hop hand." Regular means American. On hlack Afrocentric rap PBS comments: " Instead of 
rapping constantly about Mother Africa, they should come and see for themselves. When they do and fi nd out 
they cannot make money they lose interest fas t." Ray Rutledge, "Wir sind ke ine geklonten Affen." Siidd-
cutsche Zeitung Nr. 180 August 7-8, 1999. Vn. 
-· 
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foundational discourses, each one with its set of journals, cohorts and 
preachers. Their cacophonous chorus constitutes the public sphere 
which, however divisive individual clashes m ay be, tends towards a har-
monization of the system. The hidden logic of checks and balances 
according to Federalist 10 works towards a check on "excesses" and a 
new and improved "balance" of conflicting public desires.29 Indeed, 
much of the public cultural energy in America is devoted to crisis man-
agement to mitigate what Samuel Huntington identified as its Promise of 
Disharmony, a gap between high goals and low practice, between sterling 
ideals and rotten institutions. American popular culture comes to life in 
the thick anarchy of this energizing disha1mony which gives rise to a per-
manent sense of crisis and a permanent need for public argument. There-
fore popular cultural discourses often veer off into jeremiadic talking 
cures. The jeremiadic narrative tradition forms an integral part of popular 
culture production and hence sho uld not be misunderstood by Europeans, 
as it often is by French and German pundits, as a symptom of real world 
historical self-doubt, of real social decline or, alas, of cultural degeneracy 
(Ceaser). 
The English critic, Rupert Wilkinson, has identified four such basic 
fears that have mobilized the American political and social imagination. 
And these fears explain the existence of so many issue-oriented publica-
tions with fitting names such as Dissent, The Nation, Commentary, The 
New Republic, The Public Interest, Journal of Democracy (Wilkinson). 
Though none of these journals could be called popular, they occupy a 
middle grou nd in the public sphere between high and low, a middling 
public sphere Jacking in Europe. They represent in Henry James' words 
" the antennae of the race," better yet they are the tip of an iceberg of anx-
ieties. The first fear is that of falling apart which has given us books such 
as 'J'he Disuniting of America, by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Secondly, the 
29. The current network of discursive settings that are in conflkt over the defin ition or a civil society may 
be summarized as follows: a calvinist-fundamentalist discourse (Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, rel igious right 
et. al.); a conservative-libertarian d iscourse (right-wing Republicans and libertarians); a philosophy of liberal 
conservatism (mainstream) including a neo-liheral " third way" (Clinton-Blair); a left- liberal-communitarian 
d iscourse (Walzer, Rorty, Taylor, Dissent); a set of postmodern, poststructuralist, feminist, gay and postco lo-
nial discourses (politics of difference. mi nority d iscourses etc.). Each one of these factions could be broken 
down fu rther. All have their own sets of journals and publishing outlets which vie for public attention and 
compete in the high political art of agenda selling. 
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fear of falling away has produced The Culture of Narcissism by Christo-
pher Lasch or Habits of the Heart by Robert Bellah. Then the fear of 
winding down has cranked out The Closing of the American Mind by 
Alan Bloom and The Rise and Fall of Great Powers by Paul Kennedy. 
Finally, popular fantasy constantly generates the fear of being owned by 
the Europeans, Japanese, or unidentifiable "aliens." It should be noted 
that such "anxiety-books" inevitably end up on the popular bestseller list 
and in talk shows even when their quality is at best mediocre. These fears 
also inspire the plot production of popular movies as well as of popular 
fiction, and they mitTor the anxieties of modern American life. To articu-
late these anxieties and to harmonize the promise of disharmony is the 
object of culture production from the age of refon11 and immigration to 
the age of globalization. 
IV. The Politics and Economics of American Popular Culture 
Two things are clear: In the US the "soul and myth" of popular cul ture, to 
use Aristotle's terms, are intimately bound up with the public order. And 
the American model of legitimating culture differs markedly from 
Europe (cf. Bourdieu, 109). Though the Americanization of Europe may 
soon obliterate distinctions, the ruling model of legitimation in Europe 
feeds on a stubborn persistence of hierarchical habits of the heart. Car-
riers of cultural production and sources of its energy were in the nine-
teenth century the feudal tradition, estates, crafts, social and economic 
classes, the intelligentsia, folk & regional traditions, and the state. Status 
and class are still articulated in Europe tlu·ough taste and cultural prefer-
ences. The classic function of the Feuilleton is tu rise above lhe crass and 
crude and to aim for the very best, hence most cultural cri ticism in the 
daily press tends towards an avantgarde or elite model of cultural pro-
duction. 30 
The American model of legitimation is in contrast basically egali-
30. Diedrich Diederichscn claims that the longest article on popular culture the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung ever published was to critic ize it us evi l. "Die Boxen des B5sen. Warum die Zeichcn tier Popkultur 
immer wieder fa Isch gelesen werden," Sitddeutsche Zeitung Nr. I 08 ( 12./13 . Mai 1999) 19. FAZ's allegiance 
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tarian, if not populist. Equality before the law and equality of chances 
favor a common rather than elite denominator, and Lhe common man ide-
ology of populi sm denies any cultural privilege to the elite. Clearly, the 
European concept of an elite culture, as Lawrence Levine has shown, was 
grafted upon industriali zing America as a new search for order and 
quality. Since then, the elite concept has served as a permanent bad con-
science, but has not really stopped or influenced the evolution of a pop-
ular culture industry. Its prime goal, the pursuit of happiness translates 
into the empowerment of individualistic choice as a "popular chance." 
"This is a free country" is a classic American rhetorical fl ourish, popular 
among chi ldren vis-a-vis their parents. This world of chance, however, is 
not truly free, but is controlled by a Social Darwinist market, a racialized 
society and a liberal achievement filter, all with their own sets of socially 
grown advantages. Its chief attraction may simply lie in the fact that the 
modernizing trajectory of the Ameri can social utopia is ahead of all the 
other cultures. That trajectory tends towards an ever-increasing individu-
alization of life styles and of custom-made options in an ever diversifying 
world of goods, leading to what one target group specialist called the 
clustering of America. 
The American System of (Cultural) Production. The central strands 
of the American creed and the frames of legitimation set the stage for the 
"American system of manufacture" (Hounshell ), a logic of production 
which, in the creation of popular culture, is in place as early as 1830. The 
American system of production, as David Hounshell and Umberto Eco 
remind us, operates on the principles of seriality and replaceable parts, 
principles enhanced by the tendency of an emerging liberal capitalism 
toward a simultaneous centralization and differentiation . This system 
was first developed in the federal armories and adopted much later in 
industrial production. In the productio n of popular culture it was in place 
as early as 1830. It began in the Minstrel Show, then it was used in the 
Burlesque shows, in Indian Melodrama, in the Vaudeville theatres of 
Keith and Albee, later in Soap Opera and in the studio system of the film 
to high culture may explain why European patrons, music critics and record ing companies dutifully step in to 
keep the American classical and jan avantgardes going while holding the sort or jaz7. entertainers that ener-
gize the American night club scene in mild contempt. 
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industry. The tripartite Minstrel Show set the stage for what one might 
want to can in analogy to flexible producti on "flexible representation and 
performance." It was made up of individual components which could 
easily be exchanged, replaced or locally updated and, where necessary, 
adj usted to the sensitivities of regional and ethnic audiences. Minstrel 
shows were produced in series using replaceable parts, often employing 
parallel traveling teams operating under one "brand" name. Handbooks 
on how to produce your own, custom-made minstrel show became very 
popular late in the century. This system of seri al production was elabo-
rated and perfected in the 19th century and entered the cultural industry 
of the 20th century, particul arly in film. 3 1 Hence, one might argue with 
the English sociologists Scott Lash and John Urry that popular cultme 
was postfordist avant la Lettre: "We are arguing, pace many Marx ists, 
against any notion that culture production is becoming more like com-
modity production in manufacturing industry. Our claim is that ordinary 
manufacturing industry is becoming more and more like the production 
of culture." In short, the early culture industries invented the model or 
template that much later was adopted by commodity manufacture 
(Lash/Urry, 123). Such a reflexive logic of cultural production encour-
aged the professionalization of individual segments and allowed for an 
infinite differentiation of the formula. The Ziegfeld Follies may serve as 
an example. They were made up of individual acts, every one of them 
independent and highly professional. Jn such a system a W.C. Fields or 
Bert Willi ams could, and needed to, fine-tune and perfect their perfor-
mance styles and techniques of deli very in order to keep their competi-
tive edge. This system also honed the popular cul tural genres themselves 
which in turn professionalized the replaceability and seriality of produc-
tion. Hence the "American system of culture production" has a built-in 
reflexive logic of productivity enhancement, an internal traj ectory which 
gravitates towards ever greater efficiency. While the overall production 
may thus be ever more centralized, the formulaic nature of its segments 
permits a market differentiation to accomodate the desires of wide array 
3 1. Much later Paul White man at the peak of his popularity ran 3-4 orchestras a1 different places in the US 
under the Paul Whiteman logo. He wou Id shullle from one place to the other and make brier appearances as 
conductor. T his way his orchestra could be ubi4ui L<ms without any one of them having to travel. 
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of customers including the incoming ethnic group who, as Viviana 
Zelizer and Lizabeth Cohen demonstrate, have always put the nationally 
homogenized offerings of the culture industry to very particular ethnic 
uses (Zelizer, Cohen). The same holds true for Turkish-German rap 
groups in Berlin. Neither group of "discriminating users," however, can 
escape the logic or hegemonic monopoly of the culture industry, particu-
larly not in this age of digitalization. 
V. Scenarios, scripts and key themes of American popular culture 
After defining the pragmatic charters of behavior, the foundational dis-
courses of Ameri can culture, and the American system of popular culture 
production, let us look at the family resemblances in the scenarios, 
scripts, and themes which the popular culture industry has produced with 
great consistency. What follows is a cluster of motifs, tropes, and themes 
which intertwine and also overlap with the previous observations. It is 
hard to draw clear analytical distinctions and mark categorical separa-
tions, say between an (adolescent) structure of feeling and popular cul-
tural signifiers, because the historical aggregate of the American experi-
ence bundles cultural energies and cultural productions .in a constantly 
shifting, creolizing fashion. 32 Hence the following observations neither 
add up to a theory, nor even a classification, nor do they claim to be 
exhaustive. 
Scale characterizes the American mode of production and inspires its 
fantasy. Most Europeans are as struck by the horizontal expanse of Amer-
ican nature, as by the vertical thrust of its urban architecture. Both trajec-
tories inspirt fantasits of scale. The "di scovery" of America set in 
motion a Westernizing myth, put on track by Bishop Berkeley, which 
subsequently jelled in the go-West fantasy and in the trope that the world 
hist01ical progress moved from Asia to Greece to Rome, and conse-
32. Just like in the rest or the world? In Europe, as Fernand 13rauclel has demonstrated, the normative 
frame or culture~ remained stable over a longer pe1iod. The Americas, this is my argument, were in the van-
guard of modernization much earlier. 
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guently from Europe to America. The American variant of this mythical 
motion is the metaphor of the moving frontier with its Manichean space, 
a shifting, westerning boundary which opens choice and invites trans-
gression, both morally and spatially. A manifest destiny drives the Amer-
ican imagination including its moving frontier towards ever greater 
expanse and to new multitudes, that the prototypical American indi-
vidual, Walt Whitman, claimed to personally "contain". The scale of the 
landscape finds its analogue in production. Large-scale output, made pos-
sible by the American system of production, dwarfs competitors and 
inundates markets. The American "culture industry" has had an early 
start. The advantage of its size and its internal professionalization made it 
irresistible as the phenomenal early successes in Europe of the minstrel 
shows, the Buffalo Bill's Original Wild West shows and the Barnum 
Bailey's Circus or the sheer size of the Hollywood production machine 
demonstrate. 33 
The frontier is a function of spatial organization. It represents the fault 
line in what the French call a paysage moralise. And the moralized land-
scape is the best setting for a melodramatic narrative and action formula. 
Melodramatic narrative formulae are energized by a Manichean world 
view, which depends on a clear moral division between good and evil. 
Frontiers and boundaries mark the divide between civilization and 
wilderness, but al so present moral choices, between sin and grace, 
between good and evil. Last but not least, they separate winners from 
losers.34 Suzanne Braun Levine characterizes the Manichean form of nar-
rative as a "combat mode" which favors clear outcome over process, 
actions over ideas (Rosenblatt, I 08). American culture dramatizes these 
extremes which leads to "mood simplification" of complex problems in 
terms of focus, and to "mood intensification" in terms of moral passion. 
The American public is easily whipped up into "creedal passions," when 
the choices are binary, whether these be about aJcohol, smoking, Saddam 
Hussein or sexual transgression. There is clear good and clear evil or, if 
33. Si1.e, from buildings to bridges to breasts, has always stimulated popular fantasy everywhere. 
European visitors are strnck that American tour guides love tu dwell on the size, weight or cost of landmarks. 
34. Richard Posner argues that the fi xation on winners and losers is noticeable in the American system of 
justice "How American justice has failed" Times Literary Supplement (26.2. 1999). 
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this division is not apparent, prosecutors such as Kenneth Starr proceed 
on the assumption that these ought to be the only available moral choices. 
This radicalized moral dramaturgy facilitates and favors revenge fan-
tasies such as we witness almost daily on TV. "The essential action of 
melodrama," writes Jeffrey Mason, "is to polarize its constituents, what-
ever they may be - male and fema le, East and West, civilization and 
wilderness, and, musl typically good and evil ... the melodramatic world 
is composed of binary oppositions." (Mason 16- l 7). 
The porousness, studied informality and fluidity of American English 
served all the above-mentioned purposes best. Moreover, American 
Engli sh was constantly enriched by multicultural inputs. Today, "Amer-
ican" is the lingua franca of the modern business world, as much as 
"African American" is the linguafranca of music. George Steiner echoes 
Frank Zappa: "In short, the vocabularies, the contextual behaviour-pat-
terns of pop and rock, constitute a genuine lingua franca, a 'universal 
dialect' of youth. Everywhere a sound-culture seems to be driving back 
the old authority of verbal order"(Traber, 1). Because of the populism of 
the common man tradition, American dialects and sociolects do not have 
clearly identifiable class markers. In the processes of interethnic hazing, 
there occuned a honing of a global improvisational and vernacular style 
which outperforms any other global language. 
Therefore the popular stories of the world are told in "American." Ever 
so subtly, American rhetoric transports an American perspective in its 
narratives of popular culture. "Hollywood epitomizes the enduring 
capacity of the American empire without frontiers to discover, process, 
and redistribute techniques, styles and tastes of global provenance" (de 
Grazia). The conventions of Hollywood storytelling have become a mode 
of providing popular historical interpretations.35 Narrative style, charac-
teriziation, dialogue, and plots reshape our memories of Lhe past and 
reposition us for the future, which therefore becomes ever more Amer-
35. Por ordinary citizens historical knowledge of the Kennedy assassination is shaped more by O liver 
Stone's film JFK than by historical sources. American historical knowledge of Germany is inevitably s haped 
by Hogan's Heroes and holocaust fi lms. Germans take their revenge by dubbing and thus Gcrmanizing Amer-
ican fi lms. Humphrey Bogart's inviration a<l ressed to lngrid Berg1m111 in Casablanca to get soused "Here is 
looking al you, kid" is lost in translation as "Schau rnir in die Augen, Kle ine." 
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ican (Lipsitz). Carl Schmitt in 1932 expressed the apocalyptic fear that 
whoever controls the language and defines concepts or agendas controls 
the future. America, says Alexandre Kojeve resignedly with Jean Bau-
drillard in tow, is the future. 
In 1986, I characterized the storytelling of AFN TV in a way that fits 
much popular cultural storytelling: "The emplotment of the storyline, 
both for the benefit of the viewer's time and the sponsor's budget, oper-
ates on a relatively short libidinal attention span. What gave coherence to 
more traditional forms of storytelling, the plot (the three unities of time, 
place and action), is chopped up into short sequential bursts , each with 
their own simulacrum of a micro po lot .. . The goal is to create an 
unending series of reversals, moments of ecstasy and anticipation, which 
then may be usurped by the commercial ... " This serialization of micro-
plots favors roles and characters with direct audience appeal. Hence there 
is at least one character in each sit-com with whom any section of the 
audience may identify. Therefore, a noticeable typecasting prevailed in 
nineteenth-century popular fiction as well as in Bonanza, the Bill Cosby 
Show or General Hospital which in turn favors the professionalization of 
recognizable types and the enculturation of such habits of expectation. 
Instant dramatic effects that will entertain are more important than dra-
maturgical considerations of sentiment or character development. The 
chain of motivation is often interrupted by the logic of sensation. The 
overall consequence leads to a dramatization of effect and the fore-
grounding of coded, recognizable character types (Ostendorf, 1986). 
This is the narrative context for advertising, i.e. goods as soterological 
heroes. 
The American ideology of the independent self and the dissent tradi-
tion have established the practice of routinized transgression as a natural 
1ight of the protestant individual and of the imperial, "this-i s-a-free-
country" self. And yet, such transgressive acts must never challenge the 
parameters of the American ideology, that is, all transgressions are con-
tained within its basic conservative frame. The question how far can the 
imperial self go without becoming "un-American" and what constitutes 
acceptable American behavior is food for endless stories and debates. 
This model of individual liberation is seductive the world over since it 
implies the right for transformation and for an individual escape from the 
crab basket of whatever normative culture is holding him/her back from 
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fulfillment. 36 The individuation of life styles is now in its globalizing 
phase. One explanation for the success of American popular culture 
therefore may be simply that US popular culture was and is in the van-
guard of this development. 
To be born American is to be born again, again and again, argues Myra 
Jehlen. Hence the rhetoric of American culture is marked by a high 
degree of representation of personal transformation, from Hawthorne's 
Holgrave to Bob Dylan. Americanization is not a single occurrence, even 
less is being American a status, but a constant working over and at best 
an improvement over a previous condition. For a while the frontier 
became the most popular icon as the locus of transformation, as argued 
by Frederick Jackson Turner. Here the agent of transformation is the 
wilderness itself which produces the individual that "masters" that same 
wilderness in tenns of "self-improvement." But also the "wounds" of his-
tory (racism, sexism, imperialism, urbanism) are now used as new fron-
tiers or as arenas for such improvement or, in newspeak, empowerment. 
The hope of transformation is of course eminently exportable and is just 
the thing to cheer up morose youth in other parts of the world. 
The fuel for these transformative drives is the cultivation of deep long-
ings of individuals such as freedom, liberation, youth, mobility, renewal, 
expressiveness, extrication from all social contexts (romance vs. novel), 
or modernization as antipassatismo. Popular artists often create a 
supreme ego, a person liberated from all social constraints - in fiction 
this genealogy reaches from Huck Finn over Henderson the Rain King to 
Tank Girl. In this context, powerful myths of everyday life emerge, 
common and simple virtues: patriotism, temperance, simplicity, virginity, 
domesticity, pmity, honesty, sisterhood and friendship which are being 
broadcast in ever changing variations of the same. These are simple 
virtues which are best presented in simple forms of American television, 
romance, melodrama, or science fiction. Again, all these virtues will also 
be questioned and lampooned in counterveiling or dialogic narratives of 
disharmonic comedy and parody, from Mark Twain to Saturday Night 
Live and American Beauty. 
36. The image focuses on the normative resistance of local cultures to dissent: When a crab wants to crawl 
out of the basket the others pull him back. 
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Popular culture is action-oriented: pragmatic action rather than meta-
physics, application rather than theory motivates the protagonist. Hence 
the instrumentalization of violence for a moral purpose is a stock in trade. 
Indeed the Republic itself began with a right to violence. The legacy of 
the right to bear arms is allegedly secured in the Second Amendment 
which survived the violent challenge of civil war and secession. The fas-
cination with violence stands in a direct con-elation with the inviolability 
of the individual. "Violation" of the inviolable individual is therefore the 
most common theme and violence is the fuel for the defense of individu-
alism, as the impassioned defence of the right to bear arms indicates. 
Hence American popular culture is chock full of violence followed by 
revenge, resentment and rage - and guns. Death and destruction in ram-
pant popular culture, yet at the same time the denial of death in social 
mores and official public culture is proverbial. 
In a world of such violence and routinized transgression the leveling 
function of American humorous tradition has a therapeutic mission: 
humor converts downward and defuses both hierarchy and violence. 
Humor constitutes the most pervasive ritual of "antagonistic accultura-
tion." Irishmen and Jews impersonating Blacks, Jews laughing about and 
with Italians, the Alsatian Jew Chico Marx impersonating an Italian fruit 
vendor, Lenny Bruce signifying on the Pope etc. The absence of a clear 
public sense of social class makes intraethnic humor all the more impor-
tant as a means of marking identity and cultural boundaries. In Eng-
land, by contrast, humor is generated on the social fault line of class dif-
ference. 
Throughout American history there has been a dual pull: a nostalgic 
return to origins that has given rise to periodic moods of revival. As a rule 
this return to an older and simpler life involves the invention of a pastoral 
past, quite concretely in Colonial Williamsburg or in Disney's Mainstreet 
USA and Celebration City or in the eclectic hi storicizing architecture so 
popular in America from 1880 to 1930. This invention of tradition is 
inspired by nostalgia without memory.37 Yet, this nostalgic return to ori-
37. The same se111imen1 inspires cenain communitarian projects that bemoan lhc decline of family and 
voluntarism, ycl their ideal of a civil society bears little relationship to historic fact. Cohen in Smelser & Alex-
ander, 1999. 
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gins is at the same time coupled with a need for radical new beginnings. 
There is the youthful impulse in each generational cohort to begin the 
city on a hill all over again. The adage that Americans love progress, yet 
dread change couples these conflicting motives. We find them in the 
imaginaries of popular culture as well as in the rhetoric of advertizing. 
Campbell 's mass-produced soups were promoted in the late twenties as 
"home-made" or even as "unique works of art, endorsed by Sir Joshua 
Reynolds." This nostalgic lie served to counter the excessive moderniza-
tions of the age of which, ironically, advertising was a chief agent. 
Indeed, products of mass production were often advertised as therapies 
for or antidotes to the consequences of mass society. Later, Warhol re-
iconized the Campbell or Heinz can as pop art, lifting it from mass com-
modification to the level of high art, at least as far as their exchange value 
was concerned. Quite in line with his intention, he called his studio the 
"factory" where silkscreen prints with replaceable parts could be pro-
duced in series. Memory-as-nostalgia has through advertizing become a 
commodified, added value to cultural products. 
In a review of the phenomenally successful Harry Potter books Alison 
Lurie speculates on the question why there are so many children's books 
in Britain or America. Her conclusions is that in the Anglosaxon world 
since the 181h century childhood is considered the superior condition. It 
has since then enjoyed a romanti c glorification which conceives of youth 
as adversarial to and subversive of the adult world. The culture industry 
certainly confirms her observation. After 1920 the general drift of mass 
cultural design and its color scheme in particular has been toward a juve-
nile taste as witnessed in the golden arches, the gaudy displays of the 
strip or the Christmas decoration anywhere. Much of the appeal of adver-
tising is directed toward that juvenile residue in every buyer. Advertising 
executive Helen Woodward quipped: in the factory we produce soap, but 
in the store we sell youth. 
Culture of Excess and Society of the Spectacle: Popular culture, par-
ticularly in the forms advanced by adverti sing, marked a shift from lim-
ited need to unlimited desire. James Twitchell puns on the defunct older 
morality of a culture of production when he calls the motto of the new 
culture of consumption "Lead us into temptatio n." The world of com-
modification encourages the development of the "tease" as a rich promise 
of more and better things to come. Open-ended desire is cultivated and 
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encouraged by the trajectory of advertising which generates, when left to 
its own devices, a culture of excess and therefore of also of numbing 
(Bodker) which again creates its own counterveiling and deflationary 
measures, say, in "hip consumerism" (Frank) and its appropriate self-
reflexive ads. Excess is the stuff of the tall tale and of regional brag-
gadocio. Excess is the guiding principle also of Gotham, i .e. Manhattan, 
of Las Vegas, of The Strip and The Mall. Excess is the catechism of a 
consumer society with an upwardly mobile aspiration gap. At the same 
time American popular culture is marked by the dominance of the carni-
valesque and the spectacle (Debord). From conventions of the Repub-
lican Party to Coll ege football games, naturali zation rituals, ethnic 
parades, rock concerts, Oscar nominations or 4th of July celebrations the 
mise en scene is inspired by carnivaleque strategies of performance 
which reach back in history to religious "revivalism" buttressed by black 
performance styles. 
Globalizing America, Gobalizing Utopia? 
Following Alexandre Kojeve's lead Jean Baudrillard in his L'Amerique 
defines America as "utopia achieved." According to Fukuyama there is a 
"sole liberal project," and it is American. Much earlier the Wil soni an 
branch of American foreign policy pursued an "American liberal grand 
strategy" (lriye). Will all the world then become America? The utopian 
imagination in E urope and the rest of the world has associated physical 
and material well being with America. It is an Eldorado and the land of 
riches. The fantasy's global attraction rests on a simple fact: the Ame1i-
cans were the first to make bourgeois comfort affordable for ordinary 
people (Taylor, 272). Americans have contributed to the mythologizing 
of their own advantage. Tocqueville noticed that Americans treated 
goods in a redemptive fashion, as a means of undoing the curse of labor, 
and he quipped that it was hard to tell whether American preachers 
prayed for deliverance in the next world or for material well-being in this 
world. M aterial prosperity and commodification thus acquired the aura of 
redemption from want and from class ascription. The latter remained 
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coded as "European."38 In the rhetoric of American civil re ligion, secular 
and sacred metaphors often get mixed up. This helps to explain the elec-
tive affinity between religion and commodification so puzzling to most 
Europeans. Bruce Barton's popular bestseller The Man Nobody Knows. A 
Discovery of the Real Jesus (1927) heralded Jesus as the best advertizing 
and PR executive of all time who gathered an efficient team around him 
and marketed his product world-wide. Indeed, the pursuit of happiness, 
which began as a political notion , was then buttressed by religion and 
lately enhanced by sexual promise, is nowhere quite as brazenly propa-
gated as in the world of goods. Liberation, autonomy, emancipation, sat-
isfaction, bliss, instant gratification: these are the promises attached to 
the "new and improved" goods of the market. In the American adver-
tising practice, this dogma of unlimited and immaculate consumption has 
since 1970 been shot through with postmodern irony (Ostendorf, 1997). 
The promise of sexual fulfilment is translated by advertising into ever 
more sophisticated sexual tease. Rob Kroes located an ad for Levi 508 
pants in Amsterdam advertising not only Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, 
among them freedom of choice, but also "freedom of movement" which 
in this case guaranteed enough room for a full erection (Kroes).39 
Critical readers may want to challenge the mounting swell of excep-
tionalism that characte1izes this archeology of American popular culture 
as viewed from the outside. Admittedly, many of the trends when seen in 
isolation have myriad European prefigurations or antecedents. What then 
is "exceptional" about them? First, their early timjng and uninhibited 
growth within the most modern political and economic project: the 
American Republic as a market economy. Secondly, their concentration 
and historic coincidence in the period of early modernization. To many 
38. The meshing of gender, progressivism and consumption is currenlly being analyzed in greater depth 
by American historians. American advertising agencies fas t d iscovered "woman" as the "general purchasing 
agent" (GPS), thus gendering consumption and its liberatory promises. This gave a boost 10 popular, progres-
sive and emaciparory women's magazines such as Ladies Home Journal, Cosmopolitan, or McCalls . James 
Twitchell g ives three cheers lo soteriological materialism in Lead Us Into Temptation. The Triumph of Amer-
ican Materialism. New York 1999. 
39. Theodor Adorno would not have been surprised. He argued that the pursuit of happiness propagated by 
American popular commercial culture gravitates towards sexual consununation. "Alles d reht sich um den 
Coitus ." 
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Europeans modern has come to mean American. Thirdly, the profession-
alization of their niise en scene. Fourth, the carnivalesque, multiethnic 
performance styles in a society of the spectacle. 
Last but not least, American popular cultme is so popular because its 
message to the consumers the world over resonates with the promise of 
consumption at American levels. From David Potter in People of Plenty 
to Daniel Boorstin in The Democratic Experience to James Twitchell, 
authors have pointed out that the average American consumes four times 
more than Europeans, and vastly more than the third world. This aura of 
abundance and of aspiration is inscribed in goods as part of their tease. In 
popular culture as in advertizing, utopian dreams are channeled into a 
myth of salvation through commodities, a promise which makes Amer-
ican-style commodities world-wide so attractive to the have-nots. As 
identity substitutes, these goods call out to their prospective customers: 
you are the most important thing on earth (Rosenblatt, 90). Hence Amer-
ican popular culture and the world of goods caITies as a subplot not only 
the promise of personal fulfilment (from Cinderella to Pretty Baby and 
Forrest Gump), but also of material wealth and of the deliverance from 
the curse of labor. Americans have learned to take the rhetoric of excess 
in advertising with a grain of salt. They have acquired an immunity to the 
Barnumesque puffing as a subplot of their national story. They under-
stand material promise as an open-ended, even fickle agenda or as a van-
ishing point to pursue. But the soteriological aura of American goods has 
been particularly seductive for non-Americans (who miss the puffing), 
particularly to those who suffer from material want. As a pragmatic 
charter of behavior, American popular culture projects the materia l 
utopias which are part and parcel of its civic eschatology. And yet, this 
exceptional promise can never become a world dream, its utopian 
promise of abundance simply cannot be kept. The problem is that Amer-
ican levels of wealth and of comfort cannot be universalized without 
straining the ecological limits of growth (Taylor, passim). "In its heyday 
in 1960 the USA with approximately one-fifteenth of the world's popula-
tion was using about one third of the world's resources," comments Peter 
Taylor wrily (283). "Obviously this provides no basis for general imita-
tion . In fact, one estimate of the canying capacity of the world assuming 
an American standard of living is 600 million people, a figures passed in 
1675, before the US A, Jet alone the American dream, was ever thought 
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of." But this bad news has not reached the young Tungusian boy who 
will, undaunted by the global limits to growth , reverse his baseball cap in 
anticipation of more and better things to come. 
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